The recent 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings gave us an opportunity to reflect on the enormous debt of gratitude we owe to the hundreds and thousands of servicemen and women who gave their lives to ensure that we may leave in freedom and prosperity.
The commemoration of these events brought alive what an astonishing undertaking the landings actually were; requiring a complex orchestration of logistics to get man, machine and weaponry all working in harmony to realise vitally important objectives.
The sheer scale of this achievement merits further examination to understand how they managed this combined effort, and to see whether any of these strategies could be applied within our organisations.
In doing so, I have taken my lead from a BBC programme “Normandy 44 – The Battle Beyond D-Day” (currently on YouTube). In the programme, the historian James Holland posits that the 77 day Battle for Normandy reveals the reasons for the success of the invasions, and that these were operational in nature, rather than the normal strategic or tactical viewpoints that are often cited. I will summarise some of the operational aspects that the programme highlighted, and then draw out the lessons a product team can take from it.
The dangers of over-engineering
The German war machine had applied superior technologies across different weaponry and vehicles. For example, the German MG42 was very high-powered, with a rapid fire rate and a high velocity, giving them a distinctive sound when fired. The Allied guns were under-powered in comparison – the British Brenn gun fired at a much slower rate and with a lower velocity.
This power came at a disadvantage however: the MG-42 became very hot when fired over a long period of time, meaning that the barrels had to be replaced else they would melt. On D-Day this resulted in the machine gun posts eventually falling silent at around mid-day, due to the barrels melting and not being able to replace them due to cut supply lines.
Another issue with the MG-42 was its slow assembly time: it took 150 man hours (or 9 months) to make a new gun, compared to 50 hours (or 3 months) for the Brenn gun. This gave an operational advantage to the Allies, who could replenish much more rapidly, and with a longer life cycle in the field before needing to be replaced.
This pattern was replaced with the German Tiger tanks, which were incredibly powerful and destructive, and were hard to destroy – but took 5 litres of fuel to move just 1km. The Allied Sherman tank had a longer range, only requiring 2 litres of fuel to move 1km. This meant that although the Tiger tank was a dominant weapon, it simply could not keep up with the Allied pace of warfare.
Lessons for product managers
Like in a game of Dungeons and Dragons, maximising your powers (product) in just one factor (feature) is highly likely to mean that other factors will be underpowered – and this can be used against you by a more agile competitor.
Product managers need to understand the context of how and where your product is going to be used, and the variety of different jobs it needs to perform for your customers. By understanding the environmental factors, you can ensure that you are not over-powered on a factor which is irrelevant in the market.
Second, designing lean and keeping the product as simple as possible, with minimal technical debt, gives you a massive advantage in agility, allowing you to outmanoeuvre bigger and ostensibly more powerful rivals.
Responding to the facts on the ground
In the First World War, it took both armies 4 years to adapt to the conditions. In the Battle of Normandy, it took 2.5 months.
The military now use a specific term for this type of learning – the OODA Loop – which provides a framework for applied learning during operational activities. The theory is that the side with a faster OODA loop will be more likely to succeed than the side with a slower loop – as they will be able to respond to the new realities of the environment faster, and will therefore start and then continue to set the pace of change within that closed environment – leaving the other side to be reactive to those actions.
This was evidenced within the Battle of Normandy – for example, the Guards Armour Division changing their basic operating battle group from being 2 distinct brigades (1 tank brigade; 1 mobile infantry brigade) to a unified regiment made up of both tank and motorised infantry. This closed the gap between Allied & German forces in terms of firepower, whilst retaining their superiority in speed and maneuverability. The German forces were not able to sufficiently adapt their tactics to this change in their environment.
A further disadvantage for the German troops was the elongated chain of command. Panzer divisions were ready to be deployed to support the front line of Normandy, but could only be moved on the command of Hitler – and nobody wanted to wake him up to ask permission.
Lessons for product managers
Scientists now understand that the theory of evolution is not survival of the fittest, but is in fact the survival of the most adaptable. Species that are able to change and adapt as the environment changes around them, are much more likely to be successful than those that have developed a specialism that is tied to specific behaviours.
I believe that this understanding has a direct corollary with the evidence of success in Normandy, as well as with organisational success. Those companies that are able to diagnose the environmental factors and continually and rapidly respond to those inputs, are more likely to succeed than organisations who do not have this capability.
It is paramount that product teams exercise their ability to adapt to continuous change – it’s not about being first and fastest once, but being able to learn and respond to your observations, and then to repeat that process without causing stress within the team. By necessity, this means that decision making has to be pushed down to the lowest point: these people are closest to the change
Defensive strategies only work in limited circumstances
Defenders have a difficult balance to maintain during a battle; they have an advantage due to the ability to make extensive preparations to bolster strategically important locations to enhance their overall position and strength – but this advantage comes at the weakness of having to replenish those positions, and (by definition) they are held in place.
On D-Day, the German forces held a distinct advantage at the beginning of the invasion. Allied troops needed to evade the fortifications and structures inserted into the beach as coastal defences, and soldiers were hunkered down in heavily fortified concrete bunkers that protected them from enemy fire – on Omaha, this was manned by just 44 soldiers. However, as the day wore on, their ammunition stores gradually reduced, and with no operational plan in place to replenish, these positions eventually became redundant and were overpowered.
Similarly, a strategic objective for the Allied forces was to seize control of the important town of Caen within the first 24 hours of landing. Instead, the infantry had ground to a halt, and was being held to a seeming stalemate against the German forces. Although strictly true in terms of inches and yards, taking a wider perspective reveals a superior operational capability slowly providing more strength to the Allied forces. Namely – reinforcements.
The Allied army were continuing to bring in vast resources of manpower, machinery and weaponry through their man-made harbours; the German forces were simply unable to re-supply their front lines fast enough. With US forces starting a second initiative in St Lo, the German forces were stretched too thinly across too many locations, with the resultant deterioration in strength finally resulting in collapse. (see https://youtu.be/8Lnxhw39EJ4?t=2817 for more information).
Lessons for product managers
This has obvious ramifications for product managers who are facing disruptive insurgents into their industry, as it speaks directly to the efficacy of any defensive strategy that they may put into place – you may be able to slow down an insurgent company in the short term (think London taxi’s successfully putting legal barriers against Uber), but unless you have the means to continue pumping money into those defences, it really is only buying you a limited amount of time.
The inverse is also true – if you are a disruptor, don’t be disheartened if your initial progress and growth reaches a plateau (as it will inevitably will at some point). This is the point to re-examine the landscape to get a wider perspective – what has your entry changed in the market? Has it created a fundamental shift that leads to a natural arbitrage in your favour? What can you do to press home your advantage (that isn’t necessarily measured in the extra ‘yards and miles’ of growth).
This same analysis should also be done in terms of technology shifts: my own personal experience of this has been in the shift from desktop products to cloud products, in two seperate companies. In the first, we acknowledged very early on that cloud would have a transformative effect on our industry, we couldn’t change that fact, all that we could do is buy ourselves some time with defensive strategies until we could migrate the product away from the desktop.
This acknowledgement was also present in the second company, but because no customers were asking for a cloud version at that time, the work to migrate technologies was deprioritised. Then de-prioiritised again. Even when the first few customers started to churn over to cloud replacements, we were locked in to delivering additional value on the desktop version – on the then mistaken belief that because cloud hadn’t really taken off yet, that it would only really be an issue a couple of years down the line. This turned out not to be the case, and only when it was almost too late did the switch kick in, but it meant that we had to manage that migration at speed, into a market with new competitors (who didn’t have legacy problems to deal with – making their response time infinitely faster), with what turned out to be a substandard product in comparison to newly minted companies.
Summary
Having a well constructed and thoughtful strategy is a necessity, but even more important is putting into place the right culture and structures to be effective through your operational endeavours. In the Battle for Normandy, this meant ensuring you had a steady supply line and continuing reinforcements. For product teams, this means identifying the critical points of your operating model, and being quick enough at continually improving those critical points iteration after iteration.
This means a strong learning culture is essential for success: those companies who are able to release, learn and re-orient based on those learnings to release again, are at a distinct advantage over companies who are more cumbersome and cannot learn fast enough.